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A CLOSER ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
MARKETS
GREGORY J. WERDEN*
The promulgation of the U.S. Department of Justice's Merger Guide-
lines in 1982 stimulated considerable scholarly examination of market
delineation in antitrust analysis.' Recently, this law review published an
examination of antitrust markets by Warren G. Lavey.: According to
Lavey, the "affected-buyers model" provides the most reliable approach
to market delineation.3 Lavey compares the "firm-competitors model,"
the "buyers-alternative model,"4 and the Department of Justice's Merger
Guidelines' with his affected-buyers model and concludes that the af-
fected-buyers model is superior because it may produce relevant markets
that are better suited for use in antitrust analysis.6
Section I of this Article points out a number of shortcomings in La-
vey's affected-buyers model. Lavey's approach to market delineation is
not completely specified, particularly in its application to mergers. Also,
it ignores critical linkages among buyers with the effect that its use may
result in the delineation of markets that are geographically too small.
Finally, Lavey adopts a questionable treatment of supply substitutability.
* Senior Economist, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice. The views expressed
herein do not purport to represent those of the U.S. Department of Justice.
I Se., e.g., Boyer, Is There a Principle for Defining Industries?, 50 S. ECON. J. 761 (1984);
Dunfee, Stem & Sturdivant, Bounding Markets in Merger Cases: Identifying Relevant Competitors,
78 Nw. U L. REv. 733 (1983); Harris & Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated Ap-
proach, 72 C.MLv. L. REV. 1 (1984); Horowitz, Market Definition in Antitrust Analysis: A Regression-
Based Approach. 48 S. ECON. J. 1 (1981); Maisel, Submarkets in Merger and Monopolization Cases,
72 GEo. L.J 31) (1983); Werden, Market Delineation and the Justice Department's Merger Guide-
lines, 1983 DUKE L.J. 514.
2. Lavey, A Close Analysis of Buyers and Antitrust Markets, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 745 (1983).
3 Id at 747-56.
4. Id. at 756-67. The "firm-competitors model" and "buyers-alternative model" are not dis-
cussed in this Article. As outlined by Lavey, these models are clearly deficient, each having a fatal
flaw built into it. See id. at 758, 764.
5. Lavey discussed the -1982 Merger Guidelines," reprinted in 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
4501-05. Recently, the Department of Justice issued a revision, which is referred to herein as the
-1984 Merger Guidelines" reprinted in 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 44591-95. With respect to
market delineation, there are no major differences between the 1982 and the 1984 Guidelines. The
Justice Department did, however, substantially revise the text. Because of the similarity, this Article
will refer to both herein as the "Merger Guidelines."
6. Lavey, supra note 2, at 768-72.
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Section II summarizes the Merger Guidelines' approach to market de-
lineation and clarifies a number of points that Lavey and others have
confused. Finally, the Article concludes that the Guidelines' approach
does not suffer from the problems associated with Lavey's approach or
from the problems Lavey ascribed to it.
I. LAVEY'S AFFECTED-BUYERS MODEL
A. Summary of Lavey's Approach
Lavey's affected-buyers model is a three-step approach to the delinea-
tion of a relevant market for a particular firm. Step one requires the
identification of "protected buyers." 7 "Protected buyers" are those buy-
ers that (1) have "some common demand characteristics that can be sat-
isfied by [the] firm's particular output (however the output is defined)", 8
(2) "would actually purchase the particular output from [the particular
firm] if the output is priced at the competitive level",9 and (3) are "cov-
ered by the protection of the antitrust laws.'?" Step two is the identifica-
tion of the "affected buyers."'" "Affected buyers" are those that would
purchase some of a firm's output if the firm charged protected buyers a
competitive price for the output' 2 and for which the firm's sales volume
or the selling price to members would be affected if the firm charged the
protected buyers a supracompetitive price.' 3 Finally, step three is the
delineation of the relevant market with respect to the affected buyers.
Lavey summarizes this process as follows:
The output in the relevant product market includes that to which the af-
fected buyers could turn in response to a higher price, i.e., close demand
substitutes [and] . . .the output from which sellers supplying alternatives
to those buyers could divert production capacity, i.e., close supply substi-
tutes. The relevant geographic market encompasses the locations of sellers
of output in the relevant product market actually or potentially supplying
the affected buyers.14
7. Id. at 749.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 750.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 751-52. The discussion below does not use the terms "product market" and "geo.
graphic market," but rather simply refers to the "market," which has product and geographic
dimensions. While it is useful to separate geographic and product issues to some extent in market
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If price discrimination' 5 among buyers is not possible, then all buyers of
a firm's product will be "affected buyers."
Lavey does not supply definite guidelines on how to apply his model.
While this is not a serious flaw in Lavey's analysis, it leaves several ques-
tions unanswered 6 and creates needless confusion on several levels.
First, it is not completely clear whether Lavey intends a pairwise com-
parison among products or whether he intends a collective comparison.
It is imperative to make the distinction because the different comparisons
create distinctly different results. A pairwise comparison delineates the
relevant market for product A by asking whether each potential substi-
tute product is in the same market as A. Thus, pairwise comparison
involves inquiry into whether an increase in the price of A would cause
significant consumer substitution from A to B, whether it would cause
significant substitution from A to C, and so forth. On the other hand, a
collective comparison delineates the relevant market for product A sim-
ply by asking whether A constitutes a market. That question is answered
by considering whether an increase in the price of A would cause a signif-
icant reduction in its consumption as a result of substitution to other
products. 17
The uncertainty problem becomes particularly acute if Lavey intends
to use pairwise comparisons in his analysis. Lavey proposes that all sub-
stitution possibilities should be assessed with respect to "affected buy-
ers," but it is not clear whether a product must be a "close . ..
substitute" for all of the "affected buyers," for just some of the "affected
buyers," or for something in between. It appears from subsequent dis-
cussion that Lavey means neither all of the "affected buyers" nor just
delineation, it is more important to realize that there are not two independent tasks in market de-
lineation. See Werden, supra note 1, at 552-55.
15. "Price discrimination" is usually defined as "a pattern of pricing that yields different net
returns from the sale. . . of the same or different products to different customers." 2 P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 341-42 (1978). In its simplest form, price discrimination consists of
charging two consumers different factory-gate prices for the same product. Price discrimination is
often impossible in practice because the consumer paying the lower price could resell to the con-
sumer paying the higher price.
16. For example, which buyers are "protected buyers" could depend on what is meant by
"some common demand characteristics," yet Lavey does not indicate what he meant by the phrase.
Nor is what Lavey means explicit when he refers to "close supply" and "close demand" substitutes.
Also, Lavey does not explain under what conditions a seller should be considered as "potentially
supplying" a particular buyer. By failing to define these terms, which are the operative phases of his
approach, Lavey fails to provide a procedure that can be applied in practice.
17. Lavey seems to favor pairwise comparisons, but he never specifically addresses the issue.
See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
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some of the "affected buyers."'" The remaining middle ground is large
enough to create considerable uncertainty as to what Lavey's test for
close demand or supply substitutes really is.
A third level of uncertainty relates to questions of degree raised by key
phrases.' 9 First, with respect to the delineation of the product dimen-
sions of markets, Lavey refers to products "to which the affected buyers
could turn in response to [a] higher price."2 However, what consumers
can or will do obviously depends on the magnitude of the price increase.
Unfortunately, Lavey does not indicate how much of a price increase he
has in mind. Moreover, he fails to indicate the magnitude of the response
to a price increase that is necessary before certain products are consid-
ered "close" substitutes. A second ambiguity problem arises in the de-
lineation of geographic market boundaries. Under what circumstances
should one conclude that a seller can "potentially" supply the affected
buyers? Conceivably, under some conditions any seller in the world can
supply any given buyer. The circumstance to which Lavey seems to refer
is a price increase made solely by the particular firm for which a market
is being delineated.21 Lavey does not, however, indicate the magnitude of
the postulated price increase.
A final, closely related difficulty with Lavey's approach arises because
he proposes to examine the "closeness" of substitutes and to identify "af-
fected buyers" at the competitive price. It is difficult, if not impossible,
to use the competitive price as a benchmark because there is no reliable
method of determining the competitive price. If there is no method for
determining the competitive price, how are "good. .. substitutes" iden-
tified at some unknown price?
B. Problems in Application of Lavey's Approach to Mergers
Lavey's purpose "is to assess the ability of afirm profitably to charge a
supracompetitive price,"" i.e., to determine whether the firm has "mar-
18. See Lavey, supra note 2, at 757, 769-70. But see id. at 767.
19. Such uncertainties are not unique to Lavey's affected-buyers model. They arise in all ap-
proaches to market delineation because market delineation inherently raises difficult (quite possibly
unanswerable) questions of degree. Nonetheless, Lavey fails to shed light on these important
subjects.
20. Lavey, supra note 2 at 751-52.
21. While this is not made explicit in Lavey's formulation of his approach, Lavey seems to
indicate that such is the case in his discussion of alternatives. See Lavey, supra note 2, at 760 n.41.
22. Lavey, supra note 2, at 772 (emphasis added). Lavey also refers to "firms with market
power," id. at 748, and to "evaluating the firm's market power," id. at 751.
[Vol. 62:647
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ket power." Thus, his affected-buyers model is designed to delineate a
relevant market for a particular firm in order to assess its market power.
Single-firm market power is often the relevant issue in antitrust cases,
particularly those brought under section two of the Sherman Act.23 In
merger cases, however, the issue is whether the effect of the merger of
two firms "may be substantially to lessen competition."24 The competi-
tive danger in mergers generally is not that the merged firm might pos-
sess market power; rather, the concern is that the merger will
significantly increase the likelihood that several firms will successfully
coordinate their actions and raise prices.2 5 Because the primary concern
in merger cases is the increased likelihood of collusion, market delinea-
tion in the merger context presents different problems than those
presented by the need to identify single-firm market power under the
Sherman Act. Thus, a different approach is necessary to deal correctly
with market delineation in merger cases.26
One difference between these two situations concerns the price at
which substitutes should be evaluated. Lavey uses the competitive price,
which theoretically is the proper standard in determining whether a sin-
gle firm has market power.27 However, the competitive price usually is
23 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Section 2 prohibits "monopolization" which has been defined to
mean the acquisition or maintenance of market power through unfair or predatory means. See, e.g.,
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389-92 (1956); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,
429-32 (2d Cir. 1945). Thus, a threshold question in Section 2 cases is whether the defendant pos-
sesses market power.
24. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (Current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1982)).
25 See 1982 Merger Guidelines, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4501; Werden, supra note 1, at
517, 522-23.
26. Landes and Posner have argued that market delineation is a necessary step in the determi-
nation of whether a firm has market power because the direct determinants of market power (i.e.,
elasticities of demand and supply) cannot be measured easily. See Landes & Posner, Market Power
in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 962 (1982); see also R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 125 (1976). While it may be possible to determine whether a single firm
has market power without delineating a market, the situation is quite different when the issue is
whether a merger significantly increases the likelihood that sellers will coordinate their actions and
collectively exercise market power. In such merger cases, it is necessary to determine which sellers
have to coordinate their actions to exercise market power. Accurately delineated markets are essen-
tial for accomplishing this task.
27. Because market power is defined as the ability profitably to raise prices above the competi-
tive level, it is clear that the proper base price is the competitive price if the issue is whether a single
firm possesses market power. The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956), has been the subject of severe criticism because it failed to
focus on the competitive price as the benchmark for assessing market power. See, e.g., R. POSNER,
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not the proper benchmark in merger cases. The issue in merger cases
generally is not whether existing firms possess market power but whether
the merger will create or enhance market power. The proper benchmark
for analysis, therefore, is generally the price that currently prevails in the
market place (the "prevailing price") even if it is well above the competi-
tive price.28
Assume the firms in an industry are colluding successfully with the
result that price is well above the competitive level. Further assume that
two of the colluders propose to merge. Is this merger likely to create or
enhance market power and, therefore, should be prevented? Three pos-
sibilities must be considered. First, if collusion successfully produces the
monopoly outcome and would be unaffected by the merger, then the
merger would not create or enhance market power and should be al-
lowed. Second, if the collusion would continue regardless of the merger,
but the merger would allow the cartel to function more effectively, result-
ing in a significantly higher price, then the merger would enhance market
power and should be prevented. Finally, if the collusion would continue
only if the merger occurred, then the merger would create or enhance
market power and should be prevented.
Compare the effects of using competitive price as opposed to the pre-
vailing price as a benchmark in these situations. If there were good sub-
stitutes at the competitive price, it would not have been profitable for the
colluders to raise prices. Therefore, it must be the case that there were
no good substitutes at the competitive price.29 Good substitutes may ex-
ist, however, at the prevailing price. If the cartel is completely success-
ful, producing the monopoly outcome, then a further increase in price
would not be profitable. The cartel already has imposed the most profita-
ble price increase, and any further increase would not be profitable. If
the cartel is not completely successful, then further increases in price still
would be profitable because of a lack of good substitutes at the prevailing
price. The former possibility corresponds to the first case in the preced-
supra note 26, at 128. Nevertheless, as a practical matter it is very difficult to analyze substitution
possibilities at the competitive price.
28. See also id. at 128-29; Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman's View, 71 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 618, 623 n.35 (1983).
29. This is a bit of an oversimplification. The colluders might raise prices despite the existence
of good substitutes if the substitutes are available in only very limited quantities. The colluders may
also increase prices if a small increase in price did not cause a substantial increase in the quantity of
substitutes supplied. Whether either of the foregoing is the case, however, has no effect on the basic
point that substitution possibilities should not be evaluated at the competitive price.
[Vol. 62:647
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ing paragraph, while the latter possibility corresponds to the second case
above. In either case, using the prevailing price as a benchmark results
in the correct enforcement decision. Using the competitive price, how-
ever, produces the correct result only in the second case.
The only situation in which using the prevailing price produces an in-
correct result is that in which the prevailing price is likely to change
without the merger-the third case above. In that case, substitution pos-
sibilities should be evaluated at the price that will prevail if the merger
does not occur, which may or may not be the competitive price. Evaluat-
ing substitutes at future prices, in fact, always produces the correct re-
sult. Determining future prices, however, is not an easy task. Normally,
prevailing prices are the best measures of future prices and should be
used as proxies. On occasion, however, good reason may exist to believe
prices will change. For example, an environmental regulation scheduled
to go into effect may raise costs of production in a predictable manner,
which, in turn, may have a predictable effect on prices. It is unlikely,
however, that knowledge of collusion and the necessity of a merger to
sustain the exercise of market power would be of any value in predicting
future prices because it is unlikely that one could ever possess such
knowledge.
Applying Lavey's approach to mergers also raises the additional ques-
tion of how to delineate the relevant market if there are two firms at
issue, as in merger cases. Lavey may intend to delineate the relevant
market for each of the merging firms separately, without reference to the
identity of the merger partner. Lavey also may intend to redefine the
terms "protected buyers" and "affected buyers" to refer to "one of the
merging firms" rather than "the firm." This redefinition would result in
a much larger group of "affected buyers" than if only one firm were con-
sidered. Finally, Lavey may intend to define the market by reference to
the customers that the two firms have in common or those for which the
products of the merging firms are "good substitutes." This results in a
much smaller group of "affected buyers" than if only one firm were con-
sidered; indeed, there may be no "affected buyers" at all.
Each of these three approaches could produce different results. Under
the first approach, the merging firms are in the same relevant market if
the relevant market delineated for one firm includes the other. Under the
second approach, the merging firms always are in the same relevant mar-
ket. Finally, under the third approach, the merging firms are in the same
relevant market if, and only if, they have common customers or custom-
Number 4]
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ers for which their products are "good substitutes." Because the latter
two results could not be correct,30 it will be assumed that Lavey intends
markets to be delineated separately for each merging firm. Even if Lavey
intends to delineate markets separately, however, it is not clear whether
he intends the merger to affect the analysis.
C. Lavey's Affected Buyers Model Overlooks a Critical Linkage
The salient theme of Lavey's analysis is that market delineation must
consider linkages among buyers. Despite the often repeated theme of
linkages, 31 Lavey's affected buyers model fails to take into account one
very important type of linkage among buyers-namely the link between
affected-buyers and those buying from indirect competitors. This over-
sight often will result in delineation of markets that are geographically
too small.32 This shortcoming becomes evident when Lavey's method of
delineating geographic market boundaries is applied to specific facts.
Assume that a particular firm located at point A sells a homogeneous
product at its factory gate and is unable to discriminate among custom-
ers. Further assume that other sellers of the same product charge the
same price and are located in a series of concentric rings centered on A,
each ten miles from the next. Given that all sellers charge the same
price, consumers will be assumed to buy from the closest seller. If sellers
charge different prices, then each customer will be assumed to buy from
the seller with the lowest delivered price. The "affected buyers" for the
firm at point A will be individuals within a five mile radius of point A.
According to Lavey, "the relevant geographic market encompasses the
locations of sellers . . . actually or potentially supplying the affected
buyers.",33 The term "potentially" appears to refer to what would hap-
30. The problems that arise from looking only to common customers are very similar to others
discussed infra at notes 31-36 and accompanying text. Clearly, it is not necessary for two firms to
have common customers to be in the same market.
31. Lavey refers to "linkage" among buyers "links" between buyers or "linked" buyers at least
twenty times. Lavey, supra note 2, at 749 n. 11, 750, 754, 757 n.33, 758, 761, 764-67, 769, 771 n.76 &
772.
32. It appears that Lavey's approach may result in markets that are geographically too small,
It also is possible that the approach may result in markets that are too small in their product dimen-
sions for similar reasons. According to Lavey: "The output in the relevant product market includes
that to which the affected buyers could turn in response to [a] higher price." Lavey, supra note 2, at
751. This is similar to his phrasing for geographic markets. Because Lavey's criterion for delineat-
ing the dimensions of the product markets is somewhat similar to his geographic criterion, a similar
result may occur with respect to indirectly competing products.
33. Lavey, supra note 2, at 752.
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pen if the firm at A raised its price.3 4 In the event of price increase, some
or all of the "affected buyers" would buy from the sellers ten miles from
point A. Thus, the relevant geographic market for the firm at point A
could include its direct competitors ten miles away." The "affected buy-
ers" would not buy from indirect competitors at more distant locations
because the delivered price from any indirect competitor would be higher
than the delivered price for one of the direct competitors. Lavey, there-
fore, leads one to conclude that indirect buyers are not in the relevant
market. This conclusion, however, is likely to be incorrect because "af-
fected buyers" typically are linked closely with those buying from indi-
rect competitors.
A similar example better illustrates the importance of this linkage be-
tween affected buyers and those who buy from indirect competitors. As-
sume that identical buyers and sellers are uniformly distributed in a
particular area. Further posit that consumers purchase one unit of the
product per unit of area and purchase it at the factory gate from the
seller with the lowest delivered price. Finally, assume that sellers have
constant production costs per unit with no fixed costs and that transpor-
tation of a unit of the product between any two points costs a constant
amount per unit of distance. In this hypothetical, if all sellers charge the
same price, as would be the case if they acted competitively, each buyer
will purchase from a seller at exactly the same point. Under this scena-
rio, a seller at point A has one "affected buyer" that is also at point A. If
this seller raised its price, even by an infinitesimal amount, adjoining sell-
ers would have lower delivered prices at point A. Thus, the seller at A
would sell nothing. The seller at A, therefore, does not possess market
power and is not the only seller in the relevant market. Under Lavey's
approach, the relevant market appears to encompass only point A and
adjoining points. Lavey's "market" does not encompass more distant lo-
cations because, even in the event of a price increase, more distant sellers
would not sell to the "affected buyers."
A geographic "market" that includes only point A and adjoining
points has an arbitrarily small radius and an area equal to zero. Accord-
34. See supra text accompanying note 21.
35. Exactly how large markets are under Lavey's approach is unclear. In large part, this is
because Lavey fails to specify his criteria fully. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text. It
seems likely that Lavey would conclude that the relevant market has a geographic radius of at least
ten miles, and the example was constructed so that it makes no difference whether he would con-
clude that the radius was as much as fifteen miles.
Number 4]
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ingly, the sellers in Lavey's market would not impose a price increase
even if they coordinated their activities perfectly and acted as a monopo-
list. However, a monopolist within any radius of A greater than zero
would impose a price increase. The magnitude of the price increase that
would be imposed depends on the radius of the area and the unit trans-
portation CoSts. 36 A monopolist within a very small area, (but still larger
than Lavey's "market") would impose a very slight price increase. For
that reason, the relevant market should not have a very small geographic
area. How large a geographic area should be included in the relevant
market depends on how large a price increase is necessary to be consid-
ered a significant exercise of market power. In addition, for any given
significance level, any market radius could be produced by choosing the
appropriate level of unit transportation cost.
In any event, essentially all of the sellers in the relevant market would
be indirect competitors of the firm at A. They would not sell to the buyer
at point A under any reasonable circumstances, but they still are in the
relevant market for the firm at point A. Therefore, a critical linkage
exists between the affected buyer at point A and more distant buyers that
protects the buyer at A from a price increase. Lavey, however, does not
include indirect competitors in his "markets." Although this example
exaggerates the importance of indirect competitors, they often are very
important in the real world and should not be overlooked.
D. Problems with Including Good Substitutes in Supply or Demand
Lavey's affected-buyers model delineates markets that include good
demand or supply substitutes for a product of a particular firm. Lavey
appears to adopt several conventional treatments of demand and supply
substitutability which have serious problems. Although Lavey is not re-
sponsible for these problems, they are important to note.
One such problem is with the pairwise analysis of demand substitutes,
which Lavey apparently embraces. 7 A pairwise analysis of substitution
36. If we assume that price will be raised uniformly throughout the area monopolized, the
proportionate price increase (i.e., the postincrease price divided by the preincrease price) imposed is
equal to rt/3, where r is the area's radius and t is the unit transportation costs per mile divided by the
base price.
37. The case law adopts a cross-elasticity-of-demand test for demand substitutes. See Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 337, 394-404 (1956). Cross-elasticity of demand is the percentage change in the quan-
tity sold of one good that is produced by a certain percentage change in the price of a second good,
divided by the percentage change in the price of the second good. Cross-elasticity of demand implies
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possibilities is inappropriate for determining whether a particular prod-
uct could be subject to the exercise of market power, which is the ques-
tion posed in market delineation. A pairwise analysis delineates a market
by asking for a particular product whether each alternative is a good
substitute. It is possible, however, that a particular product does not
have a single good substitute, yet could be not subject to the exercise of
significant market power. Even though a price increase for product A
would not induce substantial substitution to B, or C, or to any other
individual product, it might cause a very substantial decrease in the con-
sumption of A because of small amounts of substitution to each of many
products.
A second and more fundamental problem involves the inclusion of
*"good supply substitutes" in relevant markets. Although it seems gener-
ally accepted that the supply substitutability must be accounted for in
market delineation,38 there are several alternative approaches to supply
substitutability, and at least one of these alternatives will be preferable to
Lavey's "market-delineation approach" in any one particular case. One
alternative is the "share-measurement approach." Under this approach,
the market for the product in question is delineated solely on the basis of
demand substitutability, but firms capable of producing and selling the
relevant product are considered competitors in the relevant market and
assigned market shares. A second alternative is the "share-interpretation
approach." This approach also delineates markets solely on the basis of
demand substitutability but it assigns market shares only to those cur-
rently selling the relevant product. The significance of market shares and
market concentration, however, are interpreted in light of the supply sub-
stitution possibilities.
An example clarifies the contrasts. Consider a merger between two
producers of stamped metal hubcaps, and assume that producers of other
"light metal stampings" can easily switch to hubcaps. Lavey's market-
delineation approach results in a market that includes all "light metal
stampings." In contrast, share-measurement and share-interpretation
approaches result in a market that includes only hubcaps. The share-
a pairwise comparison. It is not clear how Lavey would assess demand substitutes, see supra text
preceding note 17, but he does cite du Pont approvingly, see Lavey, supra note 2, at 751 n.19, which
adopts a pairwise comparison.
38. See, e.g., P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, at 374-76; R. POSNER, supra note 26, at
127, 132; Note, The Role of Supply Substitutability in Defining the Relevant Product Market, 65 VA.
L. REV. 129 (1979). For discussions of the case law on this issue, see id. at 136-46; 4 E. KINTNER,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 256-58 (1984).
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measurement approach assigns shares in the hubcap market to sellers of
other "light metal stampings" according to their abilities to produce and
sell hubcaps. The share-significance approach assigns shares in the hub-
cap market only to sellers of hubcaps; however, these shares are dis-
counted qualitatively to reflect the effects of supply substitutability.
Either the "share-measurement approach" or the "share-interpretation
approach" will be preferable to Lavey's market delineation approach for
several reasons. First, the market-delineation approach is conceptually
awkward. A market composed of products that are not good demand
substitutes simply does not make much sense. The purpose of market
delineation is to determine whether a single firm possesses market power
or, in the context of most mergers, whether a group of firms that coordi-
nate their action would possess market power. It is extremely difficult,
however, to address the market power question intelligently in a "mar-
ket" that includes products that are not good demand substitutes. What
does it mean to exercise market power in such a "market"? Does it mean
to raise the price of one of the products, the prices of several of them, or
the prices of all of them? If it is either of the latter two, should the price
increase be the same or different between the products? What if raising
the price of one product were profitable while raising the price of another
were not? In addition, supply substitutability often is asymmetric; some
machines can produce A or B, while others can produce only A. In such
a case, would A and B be in the same market? Would it depend on the
character of the merger, e.g., whether two sellers of A were merging, two
sellers of B were merging, or a seller of A was merging with a seller ofB ?
There are no satisfactory answers to all these questions and, therefore, no
satisfactory way of dealing with "markets" that include products that are
not good demand substitutes.
In addition, the market-delineation approach often fails to take into
account important constraints on substitution in supply. Under the mar-
ket-delineation approach, two products that are good production substi-
tutes are placed in the same market, and market shares for the combined
market are based on a firm's ability to sell either or both products. How-
ever, the ability of a seller of one product to switch to another product is
often limited. For example, the availability of gate space and landing
slots limits the supply substitution by airlines between city pairs. Con-
straints on local retail or wholesale distribution could have a similar ef-
fect in a manufacturing industry. These constraints may have an
important effect on competition, but Lavey's market-delineation ap-
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proach ignores them. Moreover, the market-delineation approach exac-
erbates the problem of having to add "apples and oranges" together to
calculate market shares. Hubcaps and bumpers may be stamped out on
the same machines, but it may not be possible to compute hubcap-
bumper market shares sensibly. Simply counting the number of hubcaps
or bumpers produced is likely to be misleading because the machine may
be able to stamp several hubcaps for each bumper it could produce. Us-
ing dollars sales as a measure may not be better because one product may
use more expensive materials or require more expensive finishing opera-
tions than the other.
Finally, the market-delineation approach can lead to conundrums.
Assume two producers of metal hubcaps proposed to merge and that
metal bumpers were good supply substitutes for metal hubcaps. Further
assume that while metal hubcaps had no good consumption substitutes
and molded rubber or plastic bumpers provided good demand substitutes
for metal bumpers. In delineating the relevant market for the hubcap
merger, are rubber and plastic bumpers included in the market, or for
that matter, are all molded rubber and plastic products included because
they are also good supply substitutes? If either of these two approaches
were used, the market shares would be meaningless. If neither were
used, the exercise of market power probably would not be possible in the
resulting "market." In either case, the analysis would be hopelessly
confused.
For all these reasons, the share-measurement or the share-significance
approach should be used instead of the market-delineation approach.
The share-measurement approach is the best of the three methods if it is
possible to measure accurately a firm's ability to substitute in production.
The share-measurement approach produces the same result as the mar-
ket-delineation approach in many cases, but it is more refined in many
cases and less awkward in all cases. If it is impossible to measure accu-
rately a firm's ability to substitute in production, the share-significance
approach is best.
II. MARKET DELINEATION UNDER THE MERGER GUIDELINES
A. Summary of the Merger Guidelines' Approach
One alternative to Lavey's affected-buyers model is the market-de-
lineation approach contained in the Merger Guidelines. The Guidelines
major premise is "that mergers should not be permitted to create or en-
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hance 'market power.' ,3 The Guidelines, therefore, define a market as
a group of products and a geographic area in which it is sold such that a
hypothetical, profit-maximizing firm, not subject to price regulation, that
was the only present and future seller of those products in that area would
impose a small but significant and nontransitory increase in price above
prevailing or likely future levels.
40
Thus, under the Guidelines, a market is a group of products and an area
that could be subject to the exercise of market power.
In delineating markets, the Guidelines begin by identifying each prod-
uct of each of the merging firms and each plant that produces it. Mar-
39. 1984 Merger Guidelines, § 1, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) % 4491; 1982 Merger Guidelines,
2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4501.
40. 1984 Merger Guidelines, § 2.0, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4492. The 1982 Merger
Guidelines used a different but very similar definition:
[A] market consists of a group of products and an associated geographic area such that (in
the absence of new entry) a hypothetical, unregulated firm that made all the sales of those
products in that area could increase its profits through a small but significant and nontran-
sitory increase in price (above prevailing or likely future levels).
1982 Merger Guidelines, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 4502 n.6. The rephrasing of the Guidelines
definition of market remedied some but not all the minor problems that existed in the 1982 Guide-
lines approach. See also Werden, supra note 1, at 542-45. The Guidelines' definition of a market and
accompanying approach to market delineation flow directly from the Guidelines' premise "that
mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance 'market power.'"
Lavey's premise is that consumers should be protected from exercises of market power, i.e., in-
creases in price or decreases in quality. Lavey asserts that this premise implies that market delinea-
tion should focus on buyers. See, Lavey, Commentary: Focus of Antitrust Markets, 62 WASH.
U.L.Q. 672 n.3 (1984). This assertion is incorrect. Consumers can be harmed by the exercise of
market power if and only if firms possess market power, and conversely, (absent regulation) firms
will exercise market power if and only if they possess it. Therefore, the premises of the Guidelines
and of Lavey, in fact, are exactly the same. Because the Guidelines' focus on sellers in market
delineation flows from the Guidelines' market power premise, a market power premise clearly does
not imply that market delineation should focus on buyers.
A related point I have made elsewhere is that market shares generally will be better indicators of
the degree of market power if they are calculated on the basis of where goods are produced rather
than where goods are consumed. See Werden, supra note 1, at 521 n.27. Lavey quotes that passage
completely out of context in an attempt to make it appear that I do not share his and others concern
with exercises of market power. See Lavey, supra, at 672 n.3. In doing so, Lavey overlooks the
essential fact that the purpose of market delineation almost invariably is to provide a basis for the
calculation of meaningful market shares. In general, the most meaningful market shares are pro-
duced by focusing on sellers in market delineation and by measuring market shares at the point of
production. This is why the Guidelines focus on sellers.
Lavey also asserts that the courts have required a focus on buyers in market delineation. See
Lavey, ;upra, at 673-74. This too is mistaken. Various courts have held that markets should be
delineated on the basis of demand factors, but such a holding does not imply that market delineation
should focus on buyers. The Merger Guidelines concentrate on demand factors to a greater extent
than Lavey and others do even though the Guidelines focus on sellers. Compare supra text following
note 38 with infra text accompanying note 50.
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kets are then delineated by applying the Guidelines' definition of a
market to each identified product and plant. In each case, the process
focuses on whether the only present and future seller of the identified
product in the identified area would impose a "significant and nontran-
sitory" increase in price in order to maximize profits. This question is
answered by using the available evidence to judge the extent to which
such a price increase would cause consumers to switch to other products
or to the same product produced at other locations. The focus is on a
product of one of the merging firms and the location of a plant in which
it is produced, and the question is first posed for a very narrow group of
products in a very small area. If the hypothetical, profit-maximizing mo-
nopolist would not significantly inciease the price of the group of prod-
ucts in the area, then the group of products, the area, or both are
expanded, and the question is posed again. At each expansion, the next-
best substitute product or location for the merging firm's product and
location is added. The procedure continues until there is an affirmative
answer to the question. This last posited group of products and geo-
graphic area constitutes a market.4 '
Generally, larger groups of products and areas also are markets under
the Guidelines' definition, but the relevant market is taken to be the first
(i.e., the smallest) group of products and area that satisfies the Guide-
lines' definition of a market.42
The starting point for market delineation under the Guidelines is a
particular product produced by one of the merging firms and a plant that
41. See 1984 Merger Guidelines, §§ 2.1, 2.3, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4492.10, 4492.30;
1982 Merger Guidelines, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4502.1, 4502.3. For a more detailed expla-
nation of the procedure, Werden, supra note 1, 524-70. Clearly, how a "significant and nontran-
sitory" price increase is defined determines the extent of the market. See also id. at 555-58.
According to the 1984 Merger Guidelines:
In attempting to determine objectively the effect of a "small but significant and nontran-
sitory" increase in price, the Department in most contexts will use a price increase of five
percent lasting one year. However, what constitutes a "small but significant and nontran-
sitory" increase in price will depend on the nature of the industry, and at times the Depart-
ment may use a price increase that is larger or smaller than five percent.
1984 Merger Guidelines, § 2.11, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4491.101. The Justice Department
elaborated in a footnote: "For example, a larger increase may be appropriate if the 'price' to be
increased is a tariff or commission that constitutes a small fraction of the price of the product being
transported or sold." Id. at n.7.
42. The 1984 Merger Guidelines state: "The Department generally will consider the relevant
market to be the smallest group of products [and area] that satisfies this test." 1984 Merger
Guidelines, §§ 2.11, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4492.101; see also id., § 2.3, 4492.30. For
further explanation and possible exceptions, see Werden, supra note 1, at 531-34.
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produces it. Thus, markets are delineated for each merging firm. A
merger is horizontal if either firm is in a relevant market drawn around
the other. A market delineated for either of the merging firms may form
the basis of a challenge to the merger.
As outlined thus far, the Guidelines' approach assumes that no price
discrimination is possible and that the exercise of market power would be
through a uniform increase in factory-gate prices. However, if price dis-
crimination is possible, market power can be exercised selectively against
only the most vulnerable groups of consumers. Under these circum-
stances, the Guidelines' approach permits delineation of "additional,
[more narrow] . . . markets consisting of particular uses of the product
for which [and particular locations in which] a hypothetical monopolist
[would] impose a 'small but significant and nontransitory' increase in
price."43 Markets still are delineated by applying the Guidelines' defini-
tion of a market, but the possibility of price discrimination alters the
analysis. Rather than postulating a uniform increase in factory-gate
prices, the Guidelines' approach postulates a discriminatory increase ap-
plied only to particular customers.
B. The Guidelines' Approach Does Not Suffer from the Problems of
Lavey's Approach
While Lavey's affected-buyers model suffers from several problems,"
the Guidelines' approach avoids all of them. Moreover, the Guidelines
present an incisive conceptual approach and outline a procedure for im-
plementing that approach. The only aspect of the Guidelines' test that is
not fully specified is a definition of a "significant and nontransitory"
price increase, and it probably is best to reserve this issue for a case-by-
case determination.45 The Guidelines' approach to market delineation is
well designed for application to mergers. Under the Guidelines, markets
are delineated independently for each product and location of the merg-
ing firms. A merger is horizontal if either firm is in a market drawn
around the other. The Guidelines also analyze substitution possibilities
at prevailing or likely future prices rather than at the competitive price.
More importantly, the Guidelines' approach carefully considers the
critical linkage that Lavey's affected-buyers model appears to overlook.
43. 1984 Merger Guidelines, §§ 2.13, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) q 4492.103; see also 1982
Merger Guidelines, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4502.1, 4502.3.
44. See supra notes 15-38 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 41.
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The importance of this linkage is best demonstrated by reconsidering an
example presented above.46 In that example, buyers and sellers were uni-
formly and continuously distributed in a given area. Thus, if all sellers
behaved competitively and priced their goods equally, then each buyer
would buy from the seller located at the same geographic point. If any
single seller raised its price by even the slightest amount, it would lose all
of its customers to immediately adjoining sellers. Because only those im-
mediately adjoining direct competitors would be included in Lavey's
market, his "relevant market" would be arbitrarily small. The Guide-
lines, however, define the relevant market as a group of products and an
area in which a hypothetical profit-maximizing monopolist would raise
prices significantly. If transportation costs are low relative to the fac-
tory-gate price of the product, this will produce a very large market. For
example, if the factory-gate price is ten thousand times the per mile
transportation costs47 and a "significant" price increase is defined as at
least five percent,48 then the relevant geographic market would have a
radius of fifteen hundred miles-large enough to encompass virtually all
of the contiguous United States.49
Finally, the Guidelines' approach to analyzing supply and demand
substitution possibilities also avoids several pitfalls. Demand substitu-
tion is not assessed using a pairwise analysis. Rather than ask whether B,
C, and so on are good substitutes for A, the Guidelines ask whether a
hypothetical, profit-maximizing monopolist for A would significantly in-
crease price. This question may be answered in the negative even though
there is no particular product that is a good substitute for A. Thus, the
Guidelines' approach does a better job at getting to the basic underlying
inquiry of whether an exercise of market power is likely. In addition, the
4t See supra text following note 35.
47 This figure may seem terribly low, but it is roughly equal to the average transportation cost
per mile for manufactured products. See F. SCHERER, A. BECKENSTEIN, E. KAUFER & R. MUR-
PHi', THE ECONOMICS OF MULTI-PLANT OPERATIONS 429-33 (1975).
48. This price increase is consistent with that suggested by the Merger Guidelines. See supra
note 41
49 Recall that proportionate price increase in an area of any given radius is given by rt/3. See
supra note 36. If we let t equal .0001 and the proportionate increase in price equal .05 (five percent),
then we can solve for r: r = (.05 x 3)/(.0001) = 1500.
One commentator argues that the Guidelines' approach suffers also from the problems of exclud-
ing indirect competitors. See Boyer, Is There a Principle for Defining Industries?: Reply, S. ECON. J.
(forthcoming 1985). His rationale, appears to be that the Guidelines also adopt a pairwise assess-
ment of demand substitutes. Boyer does not provide any support for his assertions, and this Article
demonstrates that they are erroneous.
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Guidelines define a market as a group of products and an area over
which a hypothetical, profit-maximizing firm that was the only present
and future seller would significantly increase price. Competition from
new sellers, which may prevent the exercise of market power, is not con-
sidered in this definition. Thus, the Guidelines do not include products
in the relevant market just because they are good supply substitutes.
Rather, the share-measurement and the share-interpretation approaches
are used to account for supply substitutability.50
C. The Guidelines Do Not Suffer from the Problems Attributed to it
by Lavey
Lavey argues that his approach is superior to that of the Merger
Guidelines:
The essential distinction between the approach to market definition in the
Justice Department guidelines and the affected-buyers model involves the
starting point and direction of analysis. The Justice Department guidelines
start on the level of the firm's product and shipment pattern, and ask
whether a narrower baseline for identifying substitutes is indicated by possi-
ble price discrimination (i.e., segmentations). In contrast, the affected-buy-
ers model starts on the level of what is demanded by a group of buyers and
the locations of sellers to those buyers, and asks whether a broader baseline
for identifying substitutes is indicated by possible linkages. In some cases,
the distinction leads to different market definitions, with the affected-buyers
model corresponding more closely to the competitive checks of the market
50. See 1984 Merger Guidelines, §§ 2.21, 3.3, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4492.201,
4493.30; 1982 Merger Guidelines, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 4502.201.
An important distinction between the Merger Guidelines' approach and that of others including
Lavey is that the Guidelines' approach separates market delineation from the measurement of mar-
ket shares. This separation is most visible in the case of supply substitutability, but it extends much
further. For example, issues such as whether market shares should be measured in terms of sales,
shipments, production, capacity, or reserves and whether all sales, shipments, production, capacity,
or reserve should be counted are considered in a separate step of the analysis. See 1984 Merger
Guidelines, § 2.4, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4492.40; 1982 Merger Guidelines, 2 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 4502.4. Lavey fails to consider this fact in reaching the erroneous conclusion that
long-term coal contracts would present a problem for the Guidelines. See Lavey, supra note 40, at
674. In fact, the Guidelines' approach has been applied with great success to coal markets in which
long-term contracts are used extensively, and that success is due in large part to the Guidelines'
focus on sellers rather than buyers in delineating markets. See U.S. Department of Justice, Competi-
tion in the Coal Industry (December 1982) (delineating relevant markets for coal in the western U.S.
on the basis of the location of coal deposits rather than coal consumers); U.S. Department of Justice,
Competition in the Coal Industry (April 1983) (measuring market shares in coal markets of the
western U.S. on the basis of uncommitted coal reserves).
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place. 5 1
To illustrate this point, Lavey applies the Guidelines to the facts of Spec-
trofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc. 52 Thus it is useful to con-
sider how those facts are analyzed by Lavey and how they would be
analyzed under the Guidelines' approach.
Beckman Instruments manufactured, sold, and serviced a wide variety
of scientific instruments including liquid scintillation counters, amino
acid analyzers, spectrophotometers, and ultracentrifuges." Spectrofuge
provided service for such instruments, and a very large portion of its
total business came from servicing of Beckman's ultracentrifuges.5 4
Spectrofuge alleged that Beckman monopolized a market consisting of
the servicing of Beckman ultracentrifuges. 5 A Beckman witness testified
that servicing its ultracentrifuges was not a distinct market because ser-
vice itself was not a major source of income for instrument companies
and "a good service department [was] essential to a healthy rate of
sales."56 While the court expressed considerable skepticism about Spec-
trofuge's alleged market, it appears that the court disposed of the case
51. Lavey, supra note 2, at 769. Exactly what Lavey means by this is unclear. However, it
appears that he has been misled as to how the Guidelines' approach actually works. He refers to
(essentially quotes) two portions of the 1982 Merger Guidelines that discuss "provisional markets."
Compare Lavey, supra note 2, at 768-69 ("[The Guidelines] take the products of the merging firms
and existing patterns of supply and demand as a beginning point." "[The Guidelines] ... take the
location of the merging firm as a beginning point and establish a provisional geographic market
based on the shipment patterns of that firm and its closest competitors.") with 1982 Merger Guide-
hnes, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4502.1, 4502.3 ("Taking the product at the merging firm as a
starting point, the Department will establish a provisional product market. The Department will
include in the provisional market those products that the merging firm's customers view as good
substitutes at prevailing prices." "Taking the location of the merging firm (or each plant, for mul-
tiplant firms) as a beginning point, the Department will establish a provisional market based upon
the shipment patterns of that firm and its closest competitors."). The reader may note, however,
that the preceding discussion on the Guidelines' approach did not mention "provisional markets."
"Provisional markets" appear to have been an undefined pedogogical tool used in the 1982 Guide-
lines to explain their market-delineation procedure, but really were never a part of that procedure.
The 1982 Guidelines, however, were unclear on this point, and confusion has been the result. Cf
Harris & Jorde, Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines for Antitrust Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L.
REV. 464, 479-81 (1983) (arguing that the Guidelines produce overly broad markets because of the
way "provisional markets" are constructed). The 1984 Merger Guidelines eliminate the problem,
deleting all references to "provisional markets." See 1984 Guidelines, §§ 2.1, 2.3, 2 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) f 4492.10, 4492.30.
52. 575 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979).
53. Id. at 258.
54. Id. at 259-60, 284.
55. Id. at 277.
56. Id. at 279.
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primarily on other grounds. 7 Lavey's reading of the court's opinion is
somewhat different:
The court in Spectrofuge found that Beckman faced vigorous competition
for new buyers of its instruments and that current and future revenues from
sales to new buyers were large relative to revenues from services to existing
owners. The product market was defined to include the suppliers compet-
ing with Beckman for sales of the package of a new instrument and repair
service. The court concluded that a supracompetitive price for the package
would drive potential instrument buyers away from Beckman in a sufficient
number to make the higher price unprofitable. 58
Lavey argues that the court was correct in concluding that the relevant
market included both the sale and the servicing of instruments.5 9 He also
applies the facts of Spectrofuge to hypothetical mergers and argues that
the Merger Guidelines may produce the wrong result in these hypotheti-
cals because of a "lack of guidance on how to define a firm's product":
If the analysis begins with the instruments as the product, the Justice
Department guidelines would indicate that a proper product market is sales
of all instruments which are demand or supply substitutes for Beckman's
instruments ...
If the analysis begins with service as the product, the product market
would be defined in terms of firms that provide or could provide service for
Beckman's instruments, supposing that services for other machines are
neither supply nor demand substitutes ...
Finally, if the analysis begins with packages of instruments and service as
the product, the product market would include all instruments which are
demand or supply substitutes for Beckman's instruments and all services
for all of these instruments.60
Lavey, however, does not correctly apply the Guidelines to the facts of
Spectrofuge.
First, the Guidelines do not take supply substitution possibilities into
account in the delineation of markets. No good or service, therefore, is
included in the relevant market because it is a good supply substitute for
some other product. Lavey also errs in that, at the outset of the analysis,
he places all instruments, or at least all Beckman instruments, in the
relevant market. The Guidelines' approach never begins the analysis of a
market with such a broad grouping. Rather, the Guidelines' approach
57. Id. at 277-86.
58. Lavey, supra note 2, at 754.
59. See id. at 753-54, 771.
60. Id. at 770-71.
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begins with each product, narrowly defined.61 Thus, an analysis of Spec-
trofuge under the Guidelines should begin with the sale of individual in-
struments and with the servicing of individual instruments. All of
Lavey's three options employ overly broad groupings. Finally, Lavey
fails to appreciate that the Guidelines delineate a relevant market for
each product of each merging firm and that any of these relevant markets
may form the basis of a challenge.62 A merger is challenged if it does not
pose a threat to competition in any relevant market.
In applying the Guidelines to merger hypotheticals incorporating the
facts of Spectrofuge, each narrowly defined product of each merging firm
should be considered. If a particular instrument produced and sold by
Beckman is the starting point for delineating a market, the relevant mar-
ket likely would consist of all similar instruments. While one kind of
instrument is probably a poor substitute for another, one company's ul-
tracentrifuge is probably a good substitute for any other company's ul-
tracentrifuge. A hypothetical, profit-maximizing monopolist of Beckman
ultracentrifuges probably would not raise prices significantly, but a mo-
nopolist of all ultracentrifuges probably would. If service of a particular
instrument is the beginning point for delineating a market, the relevant
market likely would consist of servicing of all similar instruments. An
owner of a Beckman ultracentrifuge would find servicing of any spectro-
photometer a poor substitute for the servicing of a Beckman ultracen-
trifuge. Under Lavey's interpretation of the evidence, however, the
servicing of another ultracentrifuge is a good substitute; if the price of
servicing Beckman ultracentrifuges were significantly increased, other
brands would be purchased instead. Under alternative interpretations of
the Spectrofuge facts, services and instruments still would not be in the
same relevant market. Thus, the Guidelines do produce a different result
than Lavey's affected-buyers model, which included both instruments
and service in the relevant market.
Although the two results are different, they probably should have the
same effect in the context of Spectrofuge. Under either analysis, a court
would reject the market alleged by Spectrofuge and find that Beckman
did not possess market power. The Guidelines' and Lavey's affected-
61 The 1982 Merger Guidelines were not absolutely clear on this point, but should be inter-
preted as saying this. See also Werden, supra note 1, at 527 & n.50, 531. The 1984 Merger Guide-
lines eliminate all ambiguity by stating specifically that the product must be "narrowly defined." See
1984 Guidelines, § 2.11, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4492.101.
62. See Lavey, supra note 2, at 771 n.76.
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buyers model, however, will produce drastically different results in other
cases. Assume that there is only one producer and seller of ultracen-
trifuges, that service for ultracentrifuges is supplied by a single, in-
dependent firm, and that these two firms propose to merge. Lavey would
apparently oppose the merger on the grounds that the only two competi-
tors in the "market for selling or servicing ultracentrifuges" were becom-
ing one. Under the Guidelines, however, the merger would not be
considered horizontal, and the firms probably would be allowed to
merge. The Guidelines' result is much more appealing. The two merg-
ing firms are not competitors because each firm's product is not a substi-
tute for the other's product. Rather, their products are "complements"63
and, therefore, the merger is vertical integration. Viewed in this light,
there probably is no good reason to challenge it.'4 Thus, the Guidelines'
method of not putting complements in the same market probably is more
desirable than Lavey's result of placing them in the same market.
III. CONCLUSION
Warren Lavey's affected-buyers model suffers from a number of signifi-
cant shortcomings as a tool for antitrust analysis. Lavey's approach is
not fully specified, and it is particularly unclear in its application to
merger cases. Lavey focuses on "affected buyers" to explore linkages
among buyers that limit the exercise of market power, yet he overlooks
one critical linkage, ignoring the important influence of indirect competi-
tors, and resulting in an overly narrow delineation of markets in many
cases. Finally, the convention he adopts of including in the market good
demand or supply substitutes is inappropriate.
The Merger Guidelines promulgated by the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice present a more clearly defined conceptual approach to market de-
lineation that is particularly well suited to merger cases. While the
63. Two products are complements if, roughly speaking, an increase in the price of one would
cause a decrease in the demand for the other. Often cited examples are bread and butter, or coffee
and sugar. If two products are substitutes, then roughly speaking, an increase in the price of one will
cause an increase in the demand for the other.
64. There may be valid reasons for challenging vertical mergers. The Merger Guidelines offer
several. See 1984 Merger Guidelines, § 4.2, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4494.20. In this case,
however, there is a strong reason to allow the merger. The situation is like a "subsequent monop-
oly" in which one monopolist sells to another, while the second monopolist has no market power in
buying the product. In the case of "subsequent monopoly," merging the two monopolists causes
price to fall. See, eg., F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORM-
ANCE 300-02 (2d ed. 1980).
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Guidelines' approach does not focus on "affected buyers" as Lavey advo-
cates, it does consider the critical linkages among buyers. The Guide-
lines also adopt a preferable treatment of supply substitutability. Finally,
the Guidelines do not place products in the same relevant market on the
grounds that they are good complements as Lavey appears to advocate.
The problems with the Merger Guidelines that Lavey alleges do not actu-
ally exist, rather Lavey's criticisms stem from misunderstandings about
the Guidelines' approach to market delineation. These misunderstand-
ings were at least partially caused by the Guidelines themselves, and it is
hoped that this Article will help to clarify the Guidelines' approach.
65. Revisions in the Guidelines themselves have substantially clarified several of the most mis-
understood portions of the Guidelines. See supra notes 5, 51 & 61.
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